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A ﬁrm’s expenditures for hiring skilled workers constitute an important com-
ponent of non-wage labor costs. To ﬁnd suitable job candidates, a ﬁrm typ-
ically has to post vacancies, screen resumes, and conduct interviews with
a number of potential candidates. Once a candidate is hired, it still takes
time and possibly some extra training for him or her to become fully pro-
ductive. Empirical studies show that hiring costs are substantial, averaging
between one and two quarters of wage payments (Blatter et al. 2012; Ejar-
que and Nilsen 2008; Manning 2006; Merz and Yashiv 2007). In addition,
these studies point towards a convex structure of hiring costs, i.e., marginal
hiring costs increase with the number of hires. Thus hiring from the external
labor market can be very expensive, especially if ﬁrms need to hire a large
number of workers in a particular period. However, ﬁrms have the possibil-
ity of reducing external hiring by training unskilled workers internally and
retaining them after training (Stevens, 1994). As long as the expected costs
of recruiting, training, and successfully retaining a trainee are smaller than
those of an external hire, internal training will be the more cost-eﬀective
strategy.
Our empirical analysis uses representative Swiss establishment-level data
that includes detailed and direct measures of hiring costs and training costs.
While the idea that the structure of hiring costs aﬀects a ﬁrm’s training
behavior can be applied to various types of training, we focus in our analysis
on a ﬁrm’s supply of apprenticeship training positions: Trainees accumulate
a substantial amount of human capital over three to four years, making
them viable substitutes for skilled workers hired externally. We carry out
our empirical estimations in a generalized Tobit model, accounting for (i)
truncation at zero in the supply of training, (ii) selectivity in the ﬁrm’s
training and hiring decisions, and (iii) simultaneity issues in observed hiring
and training costs.
We ﬁnd that hiring costs are substantial and have a convex structure,
which means that ﬁrms hiring many workers each period will face higher av-
erage costs to ﬁll a vacancy than ﬁrms with a low number of hires. Further-
1more, we ﬁnd that the structure of (net) training costs is concave, implying
that oﬀering additional training positions reduces average net training costs.
Our analysis shows that ﬁrms facing high (potential) external hiring costs
supply more internal training positions, as training reduces or even elimi-
nates the need to hire externally. Thus ﬁrms can save future hiring costs for
skilled workers by recruiting and training young workers internally.
The paper is organized as follows: The next section gives a brief overview
of the literature on hiring and training costs. Section 3 introduces our the-
oretical model. Section 4 describes the data, and section 5 presents the
econometric modeling and the empirical results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature on hiring and training costs
Firms may supply training positions because they expect some future re-
turn from an initial net investment in training (Oatey, 1970; Lindley, 1975;
Merrilees, 1983). This idea was ﬁrst formalized by Stevens (1994) in an in-
vestment model for a ﬁrm’s supply of training. While the costs associated
with internal training constitute the employer’s investment, returns on the
investment are given by reduced hiring costs for skilled workers. However,
given the lack of data on both hiring costs and net costs of training, Stevens
(1994) has to make strong assumptions about the structure of both types
of costs. For example, data on wages serves as a proxy for training costs,
whereas a variable indicating a shortage of skilled labor in the ﬁrm serves
as a proxy for hiring costs.
Before focusing on our own contribution, we ﬁrst review the empirical
evidence on hiring and training costs.
2.1 Evidence on hiring costs
Few empirical studies contain direct data on hiring costs. In a ﬁrst study,
Oi (1962) shows that hiring costs are equal to about three weeks of wage
payments in the U.S., whereas Barron et al. (1985) reports hiring costs of
one week’s pay. More recent estimates for the U.S. report average hiring
costs of $4,000 per vacancy (Dube et al., 2010). Blatter et al. (2012) show
2that hiring costs in Switzerland range between 10 and 17 weeks of wage
payments.1
The magnitude of hiring costs is crucial for a ﬁrm’s supply of training.
If training costs exceed hiring costs, a ﬁrm will not supply any internal
training. However, it will oﬀer training positions if training costs are lower
than hiring costs, and if it expects to retain a suﬃciently high number of
trainees. Thus if training costs were suﬃciently low, a ﬁrm would not hire
externally but instead only retain former trainees as skilled workers.
Depending on the structure of hiring costs, a ﬁrm may ﬁnd it optimal
to hire externally and supply some training. This situation applies if hiring
costs are convex, i.e., if hiring more workers in a given period becomes in-
creasingly expensive. If hiring costs were concave, ﬁrms would ﬁnd it cheaper
to hire many workers at once – making internal training less beneﬁcial to the
ﬁrm. In a recent contribution, Blatter et al. (2012) show that hiring costs
ins Switzerland are convex. Manning (2006) provides evidence that hiring
costs are convex in the UK, and Pfann and Verspagen (1989) ﬁnd increasing
marginal hiring costs for Dutch ﬁrms that increase their labor force signiﬁ-
cantly. For France, Abowd and Kramarz (2003) report that hiring costs are
concave, whereas Kramarz and Michaud (2010) later ﬁnd evidence for linear
hiring costs.
2.2 Evidence on training costs
Direct and detailed data on training costs are relatively scarce. Much of the
training literature focuses on a ﬁrm’s training decision rather than on its
training costs.
A series of surveys contains information on the costs and beneﬁts of train-
ing apprentices in Germany and Switzerland, two countries with a long tra-
dition of apprenticeship training. While the costs of apprenticeship training
are outweighed by short-term training beneﬁts for Swiss ﬁrms, apprentice-
ship training tends to be a net investment for German ﬁrms (Muehlemann
et al., 2010). A recent survey on apprenticeships, including both a detailed
1A recent survey on hiring costs appears in Manning (2011), with the earlier literature
summarized in Hamermesh and Pfann (1996).
3treatment of cost-beneﬁt analysis and the general features of apprenticeship
markets is provided by Wolter and Ryan (2011).
Without considering hiring costs, Muehlemann et al. (2007) ﬁnd that
expected training costs are an important determinant of a ﬁrm’s decision to
train apprentices in Switzerland. Muehlemann et al. (2010) show that ex-
pected training costs are signiﬁcantly higher in Switzerland for non-training
ﬁrms than for ﬁrms that oﬀer training, whereas they ﬁnd no signiﬁcant
diﬀerence in Germany.
A number of studies attempt to indirectly assess post-training beneﬁts
by analyzing retention rates of apprentices, tenure, or wages of movers and
stayers (e.g., Booth and Satchell, 1994; Cappelli, 2004; Dustmann et al.,
1997; Euwals and Winkelmann, 2002; Winkelmann, 1996).
In contrast to the literature on ﬁrm-sponsored training, we can carry
out our analysis using detailed and direct ﬁrm-level data on both hiring
and training costs. Thus our contribution is to simultaneously estimate the
eﬀects of hiring costs and training costs on a ﬁrm’s supply of apprentices.
3 Model
In this section, we use a model for dynamic labor demand to formalize
the idea that ﬁrms can adjust their skilled labor force not only by hiring
skilled workers from the external labor market, but also by training unskilled
workers internally and retaining them after training. The incentives for
investment in costly training are given by lower hiring costs in the future.
The role of training in the decision-making process of the ﬁrm can be
illustrated by the following inter-temporal proﬁt maximization problem,
where the ﬁrm’s hiring and training decision can be regarded as a prob-







βi [F(Nt+i) − wt+iNt+i − f(Rt+i,Nt+i) − g[Lt+i]]
)
subject to the constraint representing the law of motion for the ﬁrm’s number
4of employees
Nt+1 = (1 − δt)Nt + Rt + (1 − γt)Lt−s
where Et is the expectation operator conditional on information in period
t. The ﬁrm’s production function F(N) depends on the number of skilled
workers N. The wage is denoted by w. Training lasts s periods, hence a
trainee recruited in period t−s may be employed as a skilled worker in period
t+1. Skilled workers and trainees have separation rates δ and γ respectively,
with 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1. The trainees’ separation rate γ implies that
if Lt trainees are recruited in period t, there will remain (1 − γ)Lt trainees
at the end of their training. β is the discount factor. We represent the costs
of hiring by f(Rt+i,Nt+i). This function has as its arguments the number of
recruits R and the number of skilled workers N. At this point, we do not yet
specify a functional form of the hiring costs function. However, the results
in the empirical section indicate that the hiring cost function is convex in
the number of recruits.
Net costs of training are denoted by g(Lt+i). These costs are deﬁned as
net of a trainee’s contribution to the ﬁrm’s output. Therefore, skilled labor
is the only production factor in our model.
The constraint representing the evolution of the ﬁrm’s number of em-
ployees illustrates the two possibilities of a ﬁrm to increase the number of
skilled workers N. The ﬁrm can expand its skilled workforce either by re-
cruiting skilled workers R on the labor market or by hiring trainees L and
retaining them as skilled workers after their training.
The solution to the dynamic optimization problem determines the ﬁrm’s
demand for trainees which we will estimate in the empirical analysis in
Section 6. Our results indicate that the demand for trainees is positively
related to the (potential) costs of hiring skilled workers from the external
labor market. Before turning to the econometric modeling, we ﬁrst introduce
the data we use for our analysis.
54 Data
4.1 Survey design and data
We use data from two administrative and representative establishment-level
surveys conducted in Swiss ﬁrms in 2000 and 2004 by the Centre for Research
in Economics of Education at the University of Berne and the Swiss Federal
Statistical Oﬃce.2 Overall, we have information on 4486 Swiss ﬁrms, of
which have information on hiring costs for 4052 ﬁrms (434 ﬁrms did not hire
externally), as well as information on training costs for 2815 ﬁrms (1671
ﬁrms did not oﬀer any internal training).3
The survey contains information on the number of skilled workers (in
this case with a vocational degree) that a ﬁrm hired in the preceding three
years. Management or the person in charge of human resources supplied
the information in a paper-based survey that the Swiss Federal Statistical
Oﬃce sent by regular mail.4 The survey contains information on the average
costs of hiring a skilled worker with a vocational degree from the external
labor market. For ease of comparison across ﬁrms, ﬁrms had to ﬁll out the
survey for only one occupation. To avoid selectivity issues, the Swiss Federal
Statistical Oﬃce assigned each ﬁrm an occupation based on the occupation’s
relative importance, before sending out the survey.
4.2 Calculation of hiring costs
The calculation of hiring costs can be divided into two parts: the costs
of recruiting a worker, denoted by r, and the costs of the initial training
necessary for the worker’s adapting to the new job, denoted by a.
Recruiting costs ri consist of the costs for posting a vacancy vi and in-
terview costs Jicai, where Ji denotes the number of applicants per vacancy
2This data was originally collected for estimating total private sector expenditures on
vocational education and training in Switzerland, as those expenditures are part of oﬃcial
OECD statistics on educational expenditures (OECD 2009).
3We excluded public ﬁrms and non-proﬁt organizations from the sample, as the prin-
ciple of proﬁt-maximization does not fully apply to such ﬁrms.
4The survey is a stratiﬁed random sample at the establishment level, where the two-
digit industry level and the ﬁrm size serve as strata.
6invited for an interview, and cai denotes the costs of conducting an indi-
vidual interview, i.e., the product of interview time and the wage of the
interviewer(s).5 In addition, we denote the costs for external advisors or
placement agencies by ei. Summarizing, recruitment costs are
ri = vi + Jicai + ei
The second part of hiring costs arises because a newly employed skilled
worker is not immediately fully productive. In the survey, ﬁrms report for
how many days dai a new worker is less productive than an average skilled
worker in the ﬁrm. The relative productivity of a new recruit is denoted by
pi. There are several reasons for a new recruit being initially less productive.
One is ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital, such as learning the ﬁrm culture, learning
production processes, and becoming acquainted with work colleagues.
Another reason for lower worker productivity is that new recruits receive
training outside the workplace. First, the ﬁrm has to pay the worker the
daily salary wdi during the number of training days dti. Second, there are
direct training costs cti for internal and external training personnel, travel
costs, or course fees. Thus adaptation costs ai can be written as
ai = dai(1 − pi)wdi + dtiwdi + cti
Total hiring costs H for ﬁlling a vacancy are the sum of recruitment and
adaptation costs
Hi = ri + ai
4.3 Calculation of the net costs of training apprentices
We deﬁne net costs of apprenticeship training as the diﬀerence between the
ﬁrm’s costs and the beneﬁts of training. Training costs c consist of the
wages of apprentices wa and the costs of training personnel wT. We denote
5There are ﬁve job categories for interviewers: management, skilled workers with a
vocational degree (by the subcategories of administration, technical or social, or crafts),
and workers with no vocational degree (i.e., unskilled workers).
7the remaining costs by x, which includes costs for materials, infrastructure,
external courses, hiring, and administrative tasks.
Thus the average training costs for ﬁrm i are
ci = wai + wTi + xi
Training beneﬁts b are calculated by the type of work an apprentice
performs. An apprentice spends a fraction α of his work hours performing
unskilled tasks that require no formal qualiﬁcations. During the remaining
time (1−α), the apprentice carries out skilled tasks. While we assume that
the apprentice’s performance is equal to that of an unskilled worker (wu),
the apprentice’s performance in skilled tasks, ςw, is lower compared to that
of a skilled worker. Finally, we denote the wage of a skilled worker by w.
bi = αwui + (1 − α)ςwi
Thus, the average net costs of training C constitute the diﬀerence be-
tween the costs c and the beneﬁts b of training, so that
Ci = ci − bi
4.4 Descriptive Statistics
In this section we provide descriptive statistics on the external and inter-
nal hiring process. Firms with internal training and external hiring activity
report the costs for internal training and external hiring for the same occu-
pation, facilitating the comparison of internal vs. external training costs.6
Table A1 shows that hiring costs are 11,888 Swiss francs (CHF7) in
ﬁrms that hire externally and also oﬀer internal training. These ﬁrms hire
on average 3.5 new workers each period.8 Firms that solely hire externally
ﬁll on average 2.6 vacancies each period at an average cost of CHF 14,286.
6Firms without internal training report hiring costs for the occupation in which they
would most likely oﬀer internal training if they decided to do so.
7At current exchange rates, 1 CHF = 0.9 $, and 1 CHF = 1.2 Euro.
8We provide detailed descriptive statistics of the diﬀerent components of hiring costs
in table A2.
8Firms with both external hiring and internal training hire more workers
each period, however, the separation rate of skilled workers δ in these ﬁrms is
only 10.2%, while separation rate is 14.7% in ﬁrms without internal training.
These results seem surprising at ﬁrst sight, as ﬁrms without internal training
even pay slightly higher wages to skilled worker (albeit this diﬀerence is not
statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level). However, ﬁrms without internal
training are typically much smaller than training ﬁrms, both in their number
of skilled workers in the occupation of interest, but also in the number of
other workers. Therefore, the observed diﬀerences in descriptive statistics
may be attributed to economies of scales in external hiring for large ﬁrms,
allowing large ﬁrms to achieve a better match quality at lower costs.9
Internal training results on average in a net beneﬁt of CHF 7304 for ﬁrms
that also hire externally (Table A1). Firms that solely recruit my means of
internal training in our observation period generate on average a net beneﬁt
of CHF 9959. However, about one third of all Swiss training ﬁrms bear
substantial net training costs. The separation rate of apprentices γ, i.e., the
fraction of trained apprentices who leave the ﬁrm within the ﬁrst year after
training, is on average 68.3% for training ﬁrms that also hire externally, and
74.05% for training ﬁrms that do not hire externally.
A ﬁrm’s number of new hires consists of the number of external hires
as well as number of trainees that were taken on as skilled workers after
completion of training.10
The summary statistics for all other variables are provided in table A3.
9Idson (1993) provides evidence for lower turnover rates in large ﬁrms. Blatter et al.
(2012) also show that large ﬁrms ﬁnd it less costly to hire a given number of new workers
than small ﬁrms. However, marginal hiring costs for large ﬁrms are convex if hiring is
above a ﬁrm’s expected hiring rate.
10Alternatively, we deﬁned a ﬁrm’s number of new hires by the number of external hires
and the average retention rate of trainees, multiplied with the current number of trainees
(rather than simply adding the number of trainees that were actually retained). For
ﬁrms that did neither hire externally nor retained any trainees we estimate their potential
number of hires by ordinary least squares, using ﬁrm size, wages, occupation and industry
as independent variables. Our main ﬁndings remain robust to alternative speciﬁcations of
the number of hires, and also if we drop observations of ﬁrms without new hires in the
period of observation. All results are available upon request.
9Training ﬁrms are on average larger than non-training ﬁrms, are more likely
to have domestic owners and are located more frequently in the construction
and industry sector.
5 Econometric modeling and empirical results
Our aim in this section is to estimate the causal eﬀect of hiring costs on
a ﬁrm’s supply of internal training positions. We are interested in testing
whether ﬁrms that face high potential costs of hiring all their skilled workers
externally supply more training.
We need to deal with two problems for which we need an econometric
solution: selectivity and endogeneity. We observe a ﬁrm’s hiring costs only
if that ﬁrm has hired skilled workers externally in the preceding three years.
We also observe training costs only for ﬁrms that actually train apprentices.
Furthermore, observed hiring costs diﬀer from potential hiring costs for ﬁrms
that hire externally but also supply internal training. The reason is that
training ﬁrms need to hire fewer workers externally (because they retain
some trainees), and hiring fewer workers results in lower observed average
hiring costs due to the convex cost structure.
Endogeneity problems arise because ﬁrms can inﬂuence both hiring and
net training costs. A ﬁrm can inﬂuence its hiring costs by adjusting time and
eﬀort for screening job applicants (thereby aﬀecting the ﬂuctuation rate). A
ﬁrm can also inﬂuence net training costs: While training regulations require
ﬁrms to enforce minimum training standards, it is always possible for a ﬁrm
to provide extra training. A ﬁnal complication is that the dependent variable
of interest, the supply of training positions, is truncated at zero.
We use a type-4 Tobit model to account for selectivity, endogeneity of
hiring costs and training costs, and truncation of training supply at zero.
The following subsection describes the econometric model in detail.11
11For a classiﬁcation of diﬀerent types of Tobit models, see Amemiya (1985).
105.1 Econometric modeling
To estimate our econometric model, we assume that hiring costs can be




o wδ (see, e.g., Manning, 2011). We thereby
account for the dependence of hiring costs H on the number of recruits
R and the number of employees Ns (skilled workers in the corresponding
occupation) and No (the number of other employees), as well as the wage of
skilled workers w. Our speciﬁcation therefore captures the stylized fact that
larger ﬁrms typically hire more workers in a given period and pay higher













Taking logs on both sides, we will estimate a regression model of the form
lnH = (α − 1)lnR + β lnNs + γ lnNo + δ lnw.12 Marginal hiring costs are
increasing if α > 0, and decreasing if α < 0.
The supply of training also depends on net training costs C. We estimate
a linear regression model, because net training costs can be negative (i.e.,
ﬁrms can generate a net beneﬁt from training if the productive contribution
during training exceeds the training costs). Thus specifying lnC as the
dependent variable is not feasible.13
Consider the structural model of a ﬁrm’s supply of training positions.
lnH = x1β1 + ε1 (1)
C = x2β2 + ε2 (2)
L = max[0,x3β3 + αH + δC + ε3] (3)






13We also estimate a model with interaction terms of ﬁrm size and the number of
trainees, as large ﬁrms oﬀer more training positions. However, we ﬁnd no statistically
signiﬁcant eﬀects. Results are available upon request.
11where L denotes the number of trainees, H the average costs of hiring skilled
workers and C the average net costs of training.
We always observe (x,L), H is observed if L = 0, and C is observed if
L > 0. The error terms (ε1,ε2,ε3) are independent of x, with a zero-mean
trivariate normal distribution. The vector x1 contains ﬁrm characteristics,
including the number of recruits, the number of employees, skilled worker
wage, ﬁrm ownership, occupation and industry. Furthermore, x1 needs to
contain at least one element that is not in x3 but has a signiﬁcant eﬀect
on hiring costs. We use the binary variable “diﬃculties in ﬁnding skilled
workers” as a measure of the tightness of the labor market. As ﬁrms have
to spend more resources on the search of appropriate job candidates when
the labor market is tight, hiring costs increase. However, the ﬁrm’s sup-
ply of training positions is not directly related to labor market tightness,
conditional on other observed ﬁrm characteristics. Similarly, x2 must con-
tain at least one element that is not in x3 but that signiﬁcantly aﬀects net
training costs. We use the variable “population share of potential trainees”,
which is deﬁned as the product of“local share of young people age 15-19”×
(1-“share of young people in grammar school”).14 Thus the variable “pop-
ulation share of potential trainees” captures the variation in the supply of
local trainees due to demographic and institutional diﬀerences across local
labor markets.15 A higher share of suitable candidates reduces the net costs
of training by increasing the probability that a ﬁrm ﬁnds a suitable trainee,
i.e., a good match. Compared to a situation in which a ﬁrm needs to hire a
less suitable candidate, a good match will reduce the ﬁrm’s required eﬀort
for a trainee to reach the desired skill level.
The coeﬃcients of interest are the structural parameters α and δ. For
14We follow Muehlemann and Wolter (2011), deﬁning a local labor market as containing
all cities an individual can reach by car from the center of a local labor market within
30 minutes. The variable “share of young people in grammar school” is a lagged variable
that measures the local share of youth enrolled in grammar schools the year before ﬁrms
in our sample decided to oﬀer internal training.
15As a robustness check we have used each of the two variables separately as an indi-
vidual instrument. For both cases, the results remain qualitatively similar, but of slightly
lower statistical signiﬁcance.
12identiﬁcation, we follow the procedure described in Wooldridge (2002).
The reduced form for equation (3) is
L = max[0,x3β3 + α(x1β1 + ε1) + δ(x2β2 + ε2) + ε3]
= max[0,xρ3 + αε1 + δε2 + ε3]
= max[0,xρ3 + u3] (4)
First, we regress L on x by a standard Tobit regression using all ob-
servations. Doing so enables us to generate a generalized residual (Vella,
1992):
ˆ u3i = −ˆ σ3(1 − Ii)φ(x3iˆ β3/ˆ σ3)(1 − Φ(x3iˆ β3/ˆ σ3))−1 + Ii(Li − x3iˆ β3)
where Ii is an indicator function denoting whether a ﬁrm oﬀers training.
Second, we need a consistent estimate of u3i to obtain estimates of β1 and
β2, as
E(lnH|L = 0,x,u3) = x′
1β1 + E(ε1|x,u3) = x′
1β1 + E(ε1|u3) = x′
1β1 + γ1u3
and
E(C|L > 0,x,u3) = x′
2β2 + E(ε2|x,u3) = x′
2β2 + E(ε2|u3) = x′
2β2 + γ2u3
where u3 = αε1 + δε2 +ε3. We can use the coeﬃcients γ1 and γ2 to test for
selectivity (Vella, 1992).
Using observations for ﬁrms that hire solely externally, we regress
lnHi on xi1, ˆ u3i, (5)
yielding consistent estimates of β1 and allowing us to test for selectivity.
Similarly, using observations of training ﬁrms that do not hire externally,
we regress
Ci on xi2, ˆ u3i, (6)
yielding consistent estimates of β2 and again allowing us to test for selectiv-
ity.
13Having obtained consistent estimates ˆ β1, ˆ β2 for β1, β2, we can estimate
β3, α and δ using the reduced form of L in terms of the following structural
parameters:
L = max[0,x3β3 + α(x1β1) + δ(x2β2) + u3]
Using our consistent estimates ˆ β1, ˆ β2, we can estimate the following Tobit
equation to obtain consistent estimates ˆ β3, ˆ α, and ˆ δ:
L = max[0,x3β3 + α(x1ˆ β1) + δ(x2 ˆ β2) + errori] (7)
5.2 Results
Before turning to estimates of the structural coeﬃcients of interest, we dis-
cuss the results of the reduced form Tobit equation, the hiring costs, and
the net training costs regression.
First, we estimate a reduced form Tobit regression to obtain the gener-
alized residual (table A4), which we need to obtain consistent estimates in
the hiring costs and net training costs equation.
Second, we estimate equation (5), i.e., we regress hiring costs on x1 and
the generalized residual (table A5). The number of recruits has a positive
and signiﬁcant eﬀect on average hiring costs, a ﬁnding that implies a convex
cost structure. The hiring costs’ elasticity with respect to the number of
recruits is 1.19. We further ﬁnd that hiring costs increase with ﬁrm size, and
strongly depend on skilled workers’ pay. In addition, ﬁrms facing diﬃculties
in hiring skilled labor externally exhibit hiring costs 20.4% above average.
The coeﬃcient on the generalized residual is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero. Thus we ﬁnd no evidence for a self-selection bias in the hiring costs
equation.
Third, we estimate equation (6), i.e., we regress the net costs of train-
ing C on x2 and the generalized residual (table A6). In contrast to hiring
costs, we ﬁnd that the structure of net training costs is concave. Hiring an
additional trainee decreases average net training costs by CHF 180. This re-
sults is mainly due to economies of scale in instruction time (training several
trainees at the same time requires less time per trainee). Furthermore, the
14result show that a 1 percentage point increase in the local share of potential
trainees decreases the net costs of training by CHF 4355. The explanation
for this result is that ﬁrms are more likely to ﬁnd a good match if the supply
of suitable young people is high. Therefore, ﬁrms with a good match quality
can save on training costs compared to ﬁrms with a poorer match quality.
The coeﬃcient on the generalized residual is negative and signiﬁcantly dif-
ferent from zero, meaning that the expected net costs of training for ﬁrms
with L = 0 are signiﬁcantly higher than those for ﬁrms with L > 0.
Having obtained consistent estimates of hiring costs and net training
costs, we estimate the structural eﬀects of hiring costs H and net training
costs C on the ﬁrm’s supply of training positions L.
The results show that both variables have signiﬁcant eﬀects on the num-
ber of training positions L (table 1). A look at the entire sample reveals that
an increase in average hiring costs H by CHF 1000 increases the number
of training positions by 0.13, implying that an increase in average hiring
costs by CHF 8,000 induces a ﬁrm to hire one additional trainee. This eﬀect
is economically substantial, as an increase of H by one standard deviation
(CHF 7174) increases a ﬁrm’s supply of training by 0.52 standard deviations
(0.93 training positions).
We then estimate the supply of training positions using only ﬁrms with
positive net costs ( ˆ C > 0). We expect a stronger eﬀect of hiring costs
on training supply for this sub-sample, as post-training beneﬁts are crucial
for ﬁrms that made a net investment in training (table 1). We ﬁnd that
an increase in average hiring costs H of CHF 1000 increases the supply
of training positions by 0.17 (third column, table 1). Put diﬀerently, an
increase in H by one standard deviation leads to a 0.6 standard deviations
(1.4 training positions) increase in the supply of training for ﬁrms with
ˆ C > 0. Including an interaction term of hiring costs and net training costs
(multiplied by (−1)), we ﬁnd that the eﬀect of hiring costs is inversely related
to the level of net training costs (last column, table 1). The coeﬃcients
on the individual variables remain signiﬁcant. Our results show that the
marginal eﬀect of average hiring costs evaluated at the average of net training
costs (i.e., ∂L/∂H = 0.236 −0.00321 × ¯ ˆ Ci)) on the ﬁrm’s supply of training
15Table 1: Determinants of the ﬁrm’s supply of training positions L
Dependent variable: Number of training positions L
all ﬁrms if ˆ C > 0
Hiring costs ˆ H (in 1000 CHF) 0.1265 0.1700 0.236
(0.0132) (0.0339) (0.0493)
Net training costs ˆ C (in 1000 CHF) -0.1341 -0.2338 -0.194
(0.0403) (0.0694) (0.0716)
ˆ H × (−1) ˆ C (in 1,000,000 CHF) 3.210
(1.040)
New hires (internal + external) 0.0705 0.2518 0.2474
(0.0386) (0.0959) (0.0883))
Number of skilled workers Ns 0.0554 0.0196 0.0185
(0.0078) (0.0087) (0.008)
Number of other workers No 0.0086 0.0086 0.0087
(0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0016)
Wage of skilled workers w (in CHF) -0.0058 -0.0011 -0.0011
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Foreign ﬁrm ownership -1.8801 -2.0506 -2.0616
(0.2526) (0.6222) (0.6309)
Aggregate cantonal (i.e., state) income 0.0142 0.001 0.0105
(in 1000 CHF) (0.0102) (0.0148) (0.0105)
Industry controls Yes Yes Yes
Job controls Yes Yes Yes
Constant -0.3487 2.348 2.0799
(0.4544) (1.0661) 1.0693
Log pseudolikelihood -427,207.90 -114,744.93 -114,457.59
Observations 6739 2114 2114
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.
16is 0.204. Thus an increase in H by one standard deviation leads to a 0.72
standard deviations (1.7 training positions) increase in the supply of training
for ﬁrms with ˆ C > 0.16
As expected, the net costs of training have a negative eﬀect on a ﬁrm’s
supply of training. If the net costs C increase by CHF 1000, the number
of training positions L decreases by 0.13. Put diﬀerently, if C decreases by
one standard deviation (CHF 13,251), a ﬁrm’s number of internal training
positions will decrease by 0.93 standard deviations (1.8 training positions).
Considering only ﬁrms with ˆ C > 0, the coeﬃcient on C is -0.23. Accounting
for the interdependence of hiring costs and net training costs, an in increase
in average net training costs (evaluated at average hiring costs) by CHF
1000 decreases a ﬁrm’s supply of training positions by 0.22, implying that a
one standard deviation increase in average net training costs leads to a 1.3
standard deviations decrease in training positions.
Furthermore, both the number of skilled workers and the number of other
employees within the ﬁrm have a positive eﬀect on the supply of training L.
The wage of skilled workers w has a negative eﬀect on L, possibly because
the wage is negatively related to the separation rate of trainees. Therefore,
a ﬁrm needs to train fewer apprentices to ﬁll a given number of vacancies.
Finally, foreign-owned ﬁrms have a signiﬁcantly lower supply of training. A
possible explanation for this result is that these ﬁrms might be less familiar
with the vocational training system or too small and specialized to provide
an entire training program.
16As a robustness check we re-estimate our model by excluding ﬁrms that oﬀer internal
training but did not retain any trainees in the preceding three years. Our main results
remain qualitatively unchanged, although the eﬀect of hiring costs becomes stronger. Ac-
counting for the interdependence of hiring costs and net training costs, we ﬁnd that a one
standard deviation increase in average hiring costs increases a ﬁrm’s supply of training
positions by 1.1 standard deviations (last column, table A7).
176 Conclusions
Firm-sponsored training is an alternative hiring strategy, as opposed to
hiring skilled workers solely from the external labor market. A proﬁt-
maximizing ﬁrm will oﬀer internal training and subsequently retain some
workers if the corresponding costs are lower than the costs of external hir-
ing.
Using representative ﬁrm-level data that contains detailed measures of
hiring and training costs, we ﬁnd that a one standard deviation increase
in average hiring costs is associated with a 0.7 standard deviation increase
in training positions. Conversely, we ﬁnd that a one standard deviation
increase in average net training costs reduces a ﬁrm’s supply of training by
1.3 standard deviations. In monetary terms, a 10,000 Swiss franc increase
in average hiring costs increases a ﬁrm’s supply by two training positions,
whereas a 10,000 Swiss franc increase in average net training costs reduces
a ﬁrms supply by two training positions.
Our analysis contributes to the understanding of why ﬁrms are frequently
willing to make substantial investments in general training. The results
have important implications, as demographic change is expected to lead
to a shortage of skilled workers in the Swiss and many other Western la-
bor markets. As external hiring becomes increasingly expensive, our results
suggest that ﬁrms will oﬀer more internal training positions to satisfy their
demand for skilled workers. However, demographic change will also reduce
the number of school leavers and thus a ﬁrm’s pool of potential trainees.
Consequently, ﬁrms that are confronted with less suitable training candi-
dates will have to invest more resources so that trainees still achieve the
desired skill level. Our results show that net training costs will increase
if the match quality decreases, which in turn has an adverse eﬀect on a
ﬁrm’s supply of training. The challenge for policy makers is therefore to
design training regulations so that ﬁrms can provide training cost-eﬃciently
to ensure the young people’s future skill formation in ﬁrm-based training
programs.
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21A Tables
Table A1: Hiring and training costs
External hiring No external hiring
Training No training Training No training
Hiring costs H 11,888.160 14,286.190 – –
(11,906.010) (14,561.400)
Number of recruits R 3.511 2.557 – –
(4.369) (2.919)
Separation rate δ 10.173 14.680 – –
(16.629) (19.907)
Net training costs C -7304.728 – -9958.906 –
(34,908.28) (33,170)
Number of trainees L 2.584 – 1.883 –
(3.205) (1.864)
Number of trainees retained 0.991 – 0.518 –
(4.078) (1.386)
Trainee separation rate γ 68.33 – 74.0542 –
(32.8435) 32.0286
Number of skilled workers Ns 11.235 4.1910 4.4994 2.3643
(29.6258) (6.6944) (9.7787) (2.7852)
Number of other workers No 26.03 8.674 10.82 4.484
(115.4) (37.62) (59.41) (15.04)
Monthly skilled worker pay w 6340.3 6459.6 6256.3 6229.0
(1417.5) (1460.8) (1281.0) (514.6)
Observations 2381 1671 1263 1424
Standard deviation in parentheses.
22Table A2: Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Std.Err. Minimum Maximum Obs.
Costs for job postings v (in CHF) 1103 1889 0 50000 4052
Costs for interview per applicant ca (in CHF) 395 495 0 8844 4052
Number of interviewed applicants J per vacancy 5 4 1 30 4052
Personnel costs for interviews J ∗ ca 2009 3877 0 83586 4052
Costs for external advisors/headhunters e (in CHF) 414 1881 0 30000 4052
Recruitment costs r = v + J ∗ ca + e (in CHF) 3878 5894 0 116117 4052
Duration of adaption period in days da 80 60 0 756 4052
Average decline in productivity (1 − p) during adaption period (in %) 29 14 0 90 4052
Daily wage w of a skilled worker with vocational degree (in CHF) 349 79 125 784 4052
Duration of training courses in days dt 2 4 0 90 4052
Direct training costs ct (in CHF) 550 1805 0 60000 4052
Adaption costs a = da ∗ (1 − p)w + dt ∗ w + ct (in CHF) 9688 11005 0 147779 4052
Average hiring costs H = r + a to ﬁll a vacancy (in CHF) 13570 13862 320 170575 4052
2
3Table A3: Summary statistics by hiring and training decision
External hiring No external hiring Total
Training No training Training No training
Construction sector 0.172 0.0999 0.165 0.115 0.125
(0.377) (0.300) (0.371) (0.319) (0.331)
Industry sector 0.162 0.118 0.162 0.117 0.130
(0.368) (0.322) (0.369) (0.322) (0.337)
Foreign-owned ﬁrm 0.0762 0.148 0.0346 0.114 0.111
(0.265) (0.356) (0.183) (0.317) (0.314)
Aggregate cantonal (i.e., state) income 48072.4 49638.7 46613.2 48434.4 48593.1
(9964.6) (10554.6) (8898.6) (10594.4) (10322.7)
Population share of 15-19-year-olds 0.0578 0.0568 0.0582 0.0573 0.0573
(0.00525) (0.00504) (0.00549) (0.00499) (0.00514)
Lagged share of youth in grammar school 0.163 0.187 0.170 0.167 0.174
(0.0644) (0.0796) (0.0675) (0.0693) (0.0730)
Population share of potential trainees (in %) 0.0485 0.0463 0.0485 0.0479 0.0475
(0.00689) (0.00717) (0.00714) (0.00690) (0.00709)
Diﬃculties in ﬁnding skilled workers 0.493 0.358 0.305 0.188 0.315
(0.500) (0.480) (0.461) (0.391) (0.465)
Observations 2381 1671 1263 1424 6739
Note: Mean of each variable with standard deviation in parentheses.
24Table A4: Reduced form Tobit
Dependent variable: Supply of training positions L
Full sample Firms with internal
or external hiring
Skilled workers Ns 0.0578 0.0533
(0.0094) (0.0091)
Other workers No 0.0082 0.0082
(0.0015) (0.0016)
Wage of skilled workers w -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001)
New hires (internal + external) 0.1289 0.1262
(0.0461) (0.0450)
Foreign ﬁrm ownership -1.7814 -1.7990
(0.2179) (0.2799)
Aggregate cantonal income (in 1’000 CHF) -0.0254 -0.0286
(0.00254) (0.00875)
Industry controls Yes Yes
Job controls Yes Yes
Constant -1.0925 -0.8662
(0.4487) (0.5558)
Log pseudolikelihood -432778.13 -292386.89
Observations 6739 4486
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.
25Table A5: Hiring cost regression
Dependent variable: ln Hiring costs H
ln(Number of hires R) 0.1856
(0.0729)
ln(Skilled workers Ns) -0.0021
(0.0530)
ln(Other workers No) 0.0209
(0.0067)
ln(Wage of skilled workers w) 1.4692
(0.1214)
Foreign ﬁrm ownership 0.0211
(0.0783)
Aggregate cantonal income (in 1’000 CHF) 0.0042
(0.0024)










Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.
26Table A6: Net cost regression
Dependent variable: Net training costs C
Number of trainees L -181.5957
(67.7274)
Skilled workers Ns 18.0259
(21.5736)
Number of other workers No 10.5812
(4.7449)
Wage of skilled workers w -1.8450
(1.0646)
Foreign ﬁrm ownership -264.1512
(3605.03)
Aggregate cantonal income (in 1’000 CHF) 133.7377
(83.1494)










Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.
27Table A7: Determinants of the ﬁrm’s supply of training
Dependent variable: Number of training positions L
all ﬁrms if ˆ C > 0
Hiring costs ˆ H (in 1000 CHF) 0.1641 0.2304 0.4208
(0.0245) (0.0490) (0.0749)
Net training costs ˆ C (in 1000 CHF) -0.1852 -0.2573 -0.1607
(0.0508) (0.1063) (0.1063)
ˆ H × (−1) ˆ C (in 1,000,000 CHF) 5.510
(1.140)
Number of hires (internal + external) 0.0534 0.2107 0.1681
(0.0392) (0.0996) (0.0931)
Number of skilled workers Ns 0.0534 0.0222 0.0212
(0.0074) (0.0100) (0.0095)
Number of other workers No 0.0091 0.0088 0.0085
(0.0017) (0.0018) (0.0020)
Wage of skilled workers w (in CHF) -0.0008 -0.0010 -0.0014
(0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Foreign ﬁrm ownership -1.906 -1.8629 -1.9507
(0.3453) (0.7111) (0.7363)
Aggregate cantonal (i.e., state) income 0.0066 0.0180 0.0112
(in 1000 CHF) (0.0132) (0.0201) (0.027))
Industry controls Yes Yes Yes
Job controls Yes Yes Yes
Constant -0.2114 0.5192 1.1581
(0.5659) (1.4591) (1.4630))
Log pseudolikelihood -289563.87 -71685.45 -77,303.29
Observations 4486 1451 1451
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. 1424 Firms with no external
and no internal hiring are excluded from the estimation sample.
28